CONSTRUCTION LAW UPDATES
GMPF Framing, LLC., v Villages at Lake Lily Associates,
LLC., 2012 WL 5364649 ( Fla.
5th DCA 2012)
In a nutshell:
Prevailing on a lien claim does not automatically entitle you to an award of
attorney’s fees.
GMPF filed a lien foreclosure
action against the owner of Villages at Lake Lily
for certain unpaid work. As part of its foreclosure suit, GMPF asserted claims
for unjust enrichment and for an equitable lien. The owner prevailed on the
lien claim and was awarded attorney’s fees under Florida Statute 713.29 as the
“prevailing party” by the Trial Court. GMPF appealed the Trial Court’s award of
fees arguing that it was improper to award the Owner fees before the claims for
unjust enrichment and equitable lien had been decided. The 5th
District agreed with GMPF and reversed the award of fees until the other claims
raised by GMPF were considered. The 5th District reasoned that GMPF
may yet be the “prevailing party” under 713.29 if it carried the day on its
other two claims. The 5th District explained that GMPF may still
prevail on the “significant issues” of the case (unjust enrichment and
equitable lien).
Espresso Disposition Corp., v. Rowland Coffee Roasters,
Inc., 37 Fla. L. Weekly D2643A (Fla. 3rd DCA
2012)
In a nutshell:
Accidently copying and pasting a provision into your contract will not remove
it from the agreement.
In
Espresso, two parties to a contract failed to realize that they had designated Illinois as the exclusive
place to bring any disputes regarding their contract. The party that drafted
the contract accidently copied and pasted a venue selection clause from another
contract. The drafter of the contract argued that the clause was erroneously
made part of the contract and that venue should be in Florida . The 3rd District held
that the case must be dismissed in Florida
because venue provisions are “enforceable and presumptively valid”. The Court
refused to excuse the drafter from his error and enforced the venue selection
clause.
Vila & Son Landscaping Corp., v. Posen Construction,
Inc., 2012 WL 4093545 (Fla.
2nd DCA 2012).
In a nutshell: Being
terminated under your contract because another contractor is willing to do it
cheaper is not grounds for contesting a termination for convenience.
In Vila , a subcontractor was
terminated by the contractor pursuant to a termination for convenience provision
in the contract. The contractor explained that the subcontractor was terminated
because someone else was willing to do the same work for less money. The
subcontractor sued the contractor arguing that the termination was in bad faith
and sought to enforce its contract. The Second District sided with the
contractor holding that the subcontractor’s termination for the reason stated
was permissible under the language of the contract.
The Cool Guys, LLC., v Jomar Properties, LLC., 2012 WL
716084 (Fla.
4th DCA 2012)
In a nutshell: When
your lien is transferred to a bond, the clock starts ticking once again on your
claim.
In Cool
Guys, a lienor filed a lien foreclosure action against the Owner’s property
after properly recording its claim of lien. The Owner thereafter transferred
the lien to a Lien Transfer Bond as provided for under Florida Statutes §713.24.
According to §713.24 once a party posts a lien transfer bond (effectively
removing the lien from the subject property) a lienor must amend its complaint
to include a claim against the bond within one year of the bond being posted.
In Cool Guys the lienor amended its complaint to include a claim against the
bond 2 years after it was posted. The Owner moved for summary judgment arguing
that the lien was transferred to the bond and that the lienor had waived its
rights against the bond by failing to amend its complaint. The Fourth District
agreed with the Owner and entered summary judgment against the lienor.
Guarantee Co., of North America v. Mercon Construction
Co., 2012 WL 1232104 (MD Fla.
2012)
In a nutshell:
Indemnification agreements can result in settlements you never planned for.
In Mercon,
the contractor defaulted on the subject project and its surety stepped in to
pay for completion of the job. After making payment under the bond, the surety
sued the contractor under an indemnity clause in their agreement. The surety then
proceeded to settle a claim the contractor had with another bond company
claiming it was entitled to do so pursuant to their indemnity agreement. The
contractor argued that the surety had no authority to settle with the unrelated
bonding company by virtue of the indemnity agreement. The Middle District
disagreed with the contractor holding that the indemnity agreement as drafted
permitted the surety to take possession and otherwise use any collateral of the
contractor in the event of a default. The court explained that the term collateral
included the contractor’s contract rights and causes of action.
BUSINESS
LITIGATION UPDATES
In a nutshell: Not all
attorneys’ fees provisions are created equal. Be careful to read the scope of
the relevant provision.
In Pastina,
a homeowner brought a breach of contract claim against a contractor that had
performed shutter installation work at his house. The homeowner prevailed on
its claim and sought an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the contract. The
trial court awarded fees to the owner and the contractor appealed. The 4th
District in reversing the Trial Court’s award of fees, explained that the
contract as drafted provided for an award of fees and costs only in suits for
collection of monies owed. The court explained that the Owner’s suit was for
breach of contract and not a collection action and therefore an award of fees
was improper.
Meadows v. Medical Optics, Inc., 90 So. 3d 924 (Fla. 4th DCA
2012)
In a nutshell: In order to determine the appropriate amount of a temporary injunction bond, a court must conduct a hearing on the matter.
In Meadows,
a former employer sought a temporary injunction against its former employee pursuant
to a non-compete agreement. The Trial Court entered the temporary injunction
and set a bond of $100,000 to be posted by the former employer. The Trial Court
set the bond without conducting a hearing on the issue of the bond amount. The
former employee appealed the entry of the temporary injunction. On appeal, the
4th District upheld the entry of the temporary injuction but
remanded the action to the Trial Court with instructions to conduct a hearing
on the issue of the amount of the bond. The 4th District explained
that the Trial Court should have conducted an appropriate evidentiary hearing
to determine whether the amount of the bond correlated to the potential damages
the defendant might suffer should the injunction have been improperly entered.
Telesur v. DOT, Inc., 2012 WL 5499994 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2012)
In a nutshell: Ignore
personal jurisdiction at your own risk, a Defendant with no connections to the
State of Florida can’t be sued in the State of
Florida .
In Telesur,
the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the Trial
Court lacked personal jurisdiction. The Trial Court denied the motion and the
defendants appealed. The 2nd District reversed the Trial Court’s
denial explaining that the Plaintiffs’ had failed to adequately show how the
Trial Court had jurisdiction over a non-resident internet corporation. The
District Court explained that in the absence of any allegations that the
Defendants had interfered with business relationships in the State of Florida , that the
defendants had set up servers in this State or that the operative tortuous
conduct came from communications made in the State, the Trial Court should not
have denied the motion.
Anarkali Boutique Inc., v. Ortiz, 2012 WL 6163181 (Fla. 4th DCA
2012)
In a nutshell: A
non-compete agreement is not terminated simply because your job status changes.
In Ortiz, a
former employer sought a temporary injunction against its former employee
pursuant to a non-compete agreement. The employee argued that when his status
was changed from employee to independent contractor, he was essentially
terminated under the contract and the non-compete had expired. The Trial Court
agreed with the former employee and denied the employer’s motion for an injunction.
On appeal the 4th District reversed the Trial Court specifically
finding that the language of the agreement did not support the employee’s
argument. The 4th District disagreed with the former employee that a
change in status was in fact a termination event.
Jasser v. Saadeh, 2012 WL 2328230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)
In a nutshell: A note
that is silent as to the date of payment is due on demand.
In Jasser,
the Plaintiff sued to enforce a promissory note against the Defendants.
Plaintiff claimed that the note was due on demand because there was no specific
maturity date. The Trial Court agreed the note was payable on demand. On
appeal, the 4th District upheld the lower court citing Florida
Statutes §673.1081 and explaining that when a note is silent as to the time of
payment, it is payable on demand.
Spencer Estates of Florida
LLC., v. Havil, 2012 WL 6719463 (Fla.
5th DCA 2012)
In a nutshell: A
separate and distinct lawsuit must be filed to challenge a property appraiser’s
classification.
Appellate
court held that in the event a property appraiser fails to prospectively
classify lands as it has in the past, the proper course of action for an
aggrieved party is to file a new lawsuit seeking to reclassify the land. The
court further found that such a claimant may be entitled to fees pursuant to
Florida Statutes §57.105.
Rocka Fuerta Construction Inc., v. Southwich, Inc., 2012
WL 6719470 (Fla.
5th DCA 2012)
In a nutshell: An
affirmative defense is just that, a defense. It is not a means to automatically
dismiss a case.
Appellate
court held that the Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of the suit
brought against it by Rocka, where it alleged that the opposing side failed to
inform the court of the existence of a settlement agreement. The court refused
to find that the failure to disclose the existence of the settlement agreement
was a fraud upon the court requiring sanctions and a dismissal. The court
explained that the existence of the settlement agreement was an affirmative
defense which the Defendant was entitled to raise.
Universal
Music Venezuela, S.A., v. Montaner (2012 WL 6681989 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2012)
In a nutshell: The
mere existence of an affiliated company of the Defendant in a State does not
mean the court has automatic jurisdiction over the Defendant.
Plaintiff
sought to bring a lawsuit against a Venezuelan company in the State of Florida pursuant to
Florida Long Arm Statute. The Plaintiff argued that despite the contracting
being executed abroad and the Defendant having no offices or employees in the
State, the court could exercise jurisdiction over the company because it was
affiliated with a company based in Florida .
The Appellate court found the lower court did not have jurisdiction pursuant to
its relationship with the affiliated company because there was no evidence that
principals of the defendant controlled or directed the activities of the
company based in Florida .
Vorbeck v Bentancourt 2012 WL 6681995 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2012)
In a nutshell:
Discovery can’t be used to create a cause of action.
On the
death of their father Plaintiffs’ inherited 50% interest in two separate
companies. The Plaintiff’s suspected that the individual holding the remaining
50% was misusing the companies’ funds and filed a pure bill of discovery admittedly
for the purpose of finding out if any wrongdoing had occurred. Defendant sought
to dismiss the bill as a pure fishing expedition. The Appellate court agreed
with the Defendant holding that a bill of discovery is not a tool to determine
if any ground for suit exists but rather to determine theories of liability,
identity of defendants or for collecting information to establish a condition
precedent when no legal remedy exists to accomplish the same end.
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